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Abstract
We document, describe and interpret changes in New Zealand corporate board char-
acteristics between 1995 and 2010, a period centred around the 2003 introduction
of the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code. Unsurprisingly, the rep-
resentation of non-executive, independent and female directors on NZ boards rose
during the period, as did real chair and director fees and the importance of board
committees, while average board size fell. Perhaps more surprisingly, much of this
movement occurred before 2003. However, the magnitude of these changes frequently
varies according to firm size, and there are some intriguing differences between New
Zealand board characteristics and those prevailing in other, larger, countries. We use
this information to identify a number of unanswered questions about New Zealand
corporate boards.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 25 years, the role of corporate governance in determining firm performance
has been extensively discussed and examined by researchers, journalists, corporate officers,
regulators and politicians. As a result of this focus, many countries — including Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, the
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) — have adopted corporate governance
guidelines or codes that are intended to encourage or require firms to adopt so-called
‘best-practice’ models of governance.1
Underpinning this legislative activity is a voluminous amount of academic research:
Adams et al. (2010), Becht et al. (2003), Clarke (2007), Gillan (2006) and Leblanc and
Gillies (2005) provide excellent summaries of the various strands of the international litera-
ture. In New Zealand (NZ), governance research has focused almost exclusively on a subset
of what Gillan calls ‘internal governance’: the role and activities of the board of directors.
For example, many authors attempt to determine the importance of a limited number of
board characteristics (usually board size and the prevalence of outside directors) for NZ
firm performance, e.g., Chin et al. (2004), Elayan et al. (2003), Hossain et al. (2001),
Prevost et al. (2002), Reddy et al. (2008), and Reddy et al. (2010). Others examine
the relationship between board characteristics and (i) executive compensation (e.g., And-
jelkovic et al., 2002; Hurst and Vos, 2009; Jiang et al., 2009) or (ii) firm derivatives usage
(Marsden and Prevost, 2005) or (iii) financial reporting quality (Rainsbury et al., 2009).2
A much smaller body of work investigates the determinants of the board characteristics
themselves. For example, Cahan and Wilkinson (1999) examine the impact of the 1993
Companies Act on outside director representation, while Mak and Roush (2000) use 1980s
IPO data to identify systematic variation in board size, outside director representation,
and the prevalence of CEOs who also act as board chairs. Similarly, Rainsbury et al.
(2008) document the relationship between voluntary adoption of an audit committee and
other board characteristics.
In all of these studies, information on NZ boards is essentially treated as a means
to an end – either as a set of exogenous variables potentially explaining outcomes of
interest such as firm performance or executive compensation, or as endogenous variables
1The New Zealand Corporate Governance Best Practice Code was developed and released by the stock
exchange (NZX) in 2003. It was subsequently adopted by the New Zealand Securities Commission as a
set of guidelines for all NZ firms, while parts of it were incorporated in the NZX listing rules.
2In addition, Cahan et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between board structure and CEO pay
in state-owned enterprises.
1
whose within-NZ variation is to be explained – rather than being of intrinsic interest.3
Moreover, these studies are necessarily limited in scope: information is provided about
only a very small number of board characteristics, different authors use different definitions
or measurements of these variables, and the sample periods tend to be concentrated in
the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, we have only a very rough idea of the overall state and
evolution of NZ boards – what one might call the ‘stylised facts’ of NZ internal governance.
In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by documenting the composition, activity and
incentives of NZ boards during the 15-year period between 1995 and 2010. We examine
the extent to which these features have changed over time, how both their levels and
trends compare with other countries, and their relationship with firm size. Such a task is
potentially important as virtually all existing research on board structure focuses on firms
from large economies, particularly the US and UK. By contrast, relatively little is known
about the internal governance of firms in small, open economies. In addition, because
the 1995-2010 time period is conveniently centred around the 2003 introduction of the
NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code, we are able to provide some preliminary
assessments of the impact of this initiative. Perhaps most importantly, we identify a
number of unanswered questions and puzzles that may well serve as a useful agenda for
future NZ-based governance research.
In the next section, we describe our data and the 22 board characteristics that are
the focus of this paper. Section 3 begins by comparing the situation in 2010 with that of
1995: this allows us to see which board features have changed and which have not, and to
make some simple comparisons with other countries. We also illustrate and discuss trends
in selected variables over the entire sample period. In section 4, we (i) investigate whether
these trends differ according to firm size, (ii) compare the board characteristics of single-
listed NZX firms with those that also list on the Australian exchange, and (iii) determine
whether board characteristics have become more or less dispersed during our sample pe-
riod. Finally, in section 5, we summarise the possible research questions uncovered by our
analysis and offer some concluding remarks.
2 Variables and Data
2.1 Variables
A full list (and accompanying description) of the variables analysed in this paper appears
in Table 1. In the rest of this section, we provide a brief discussion of the theory underlying,
and evidence associated with, each of these variables.
3An exception is Fox (1996) who describes the 1980-1993 evolution of NZ boards. However, his sample
period mainly pre-dates the resurgence of interest in governance matters and, moreover, he considers only
a very small number (four) of board characteristics – largely reflecting the data that were readily available
at that time.
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Table 1: Definition of Variables
Description and definition of the variables analysed in this study.
Variable Name Variable Description
A. Board Composition
Board Size Total number of directors on the board
Non-Executive Directors Proportion of non-executive directors on the board
Independent Directors Proportion of independent directors on the board
Independent Majority Percentage of firms with a majority of independent directors
Female Director Incidence Percentage of firms with at least one female director
Female Director Number Number of female directors on the board
Long-Serving Directors Proportion of directors with more than 5 years service
B. Director Remuneration
and Ownership
Chair Fees Fees (in 2010 dollars) paid to non-executive board chair
Director Fees Fees (in 2010 dollars) paid to non-chair, non-executive directors
Director Ownership Proportion of equity shares beneficially owned by directors
C. Director Activity
Board Meetings Total number of board meetings held during the year
Total Meetings Total number of board and committee meetings held during the year
Busy Directors Proportion of firm directors holding at least one other directorship
Multiple Directorships Average number of other directorships held by firm directors
D. Board Committees
Audit Committee Percentage of firms with a separate audit committee
Remuneration Committee Percentage of firms with a separate remuneration committee
Audit Committee Proportion of independent directors on audit committee
Independence
Remuneration Committee Proportion of independent directors on remuneration committee
Independence
E. CEO Board and Committee Involvement
CEO-Chair Percentage of firms where the board chair is also the CEO
CEO on Board Percentage of firms where the CEO sits on the board
CEO on Audit Committee Percentage of firms where the CEO is a member of the Audit
Committee
CEO on Remuneration Committee Percentage of firms where the CEO is a member of the Remuneration
Committee
3
2.1.1 Board composition
Board with a greater number of directors can potentially call on a wider range of exper-
tise. However, large boards also have disadvantages: individual director responsibility is
weakened (a ‘safety-in-numbers’ effect), and greater difficulties in co-ordinating effective
discussion can lead to a dilution of decision-making power with consequent domination by
the CEO. Unsurprisingly, therefore, evidence on the importance of board size is mixed.
Yermack (1996), Guest (2009) and Mak and Kusndadi (2005) report a negative relation-
ship between board size and firm performance for US, UK and Asian firms respectively.
However, for US firms, Coles et al. (2007) find that the link depends on firm type – the
relationship is negative for simple firms, but positive for complex firms (which have greater
need of wider expertise). In NZ, Chin et al. (2004) and Reddy et al. (2010) report no
relationship between firm size and board performance; Andjelkovic et al. (2002) and Hurst
and Vos (2007) similarly find no link between board size and CEO remuneration.
By being less beholden to the CEO, non-executive and independent directors can
potentially enhance oversight and monitoring of firm activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
On the other hand, such directors are often less familiar with the industry in which their
firm operates. Consistent with these contrasting views, some authors (e.g., Byrd and
Hickman, 1992; Dann et al., 2003; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004) find that greater board
independence has a positive effect on various aspects of firm performance, while others
(e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Barnhart and Rosentein, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002)
find the reverse, at least for some firm types. In NZ, NZX Listing Rule 3.3.1 requires that
a minimum proportion of board directors be independent.4 Reassuringly, therefore, NZ
studies generally report a positive relationship between the percentage of outside and/or
independent directors and Tobin’s Q, e.g., Hossain et al. (2001), Reddy et al. (2008) and
Reddy et al. (2010).
Greater female representation on boards not only increases the size of the human
capital pool from which directors can be drawn, but also provides some additional skills
and perspectives that may not be possible with all-male boards. In recent years, both
Norway and France have imposed quotas for female representation. Providing some sup-
port for such actions, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that more gender-diverse boards
are tougher monitors. However, they also note that this attribute only seems to be valu-
able in firms with weak shareholder rights, and that the overall relationship between firm
performance and female representation on boards is negative. Although there appears to
be no NZ evidence on the effectiveness of female directors, there is a regular stream of
media comment suggesting that NZ firms are laggards when it comes to appointing female
4An independent director is one who is not an executive of the firm and who has no disqualifying
relationship. In practice, this is generally interpreted to mean that an independent director owns less
than 5% of the firm’s shares and receives less than 10% of his annual income from the firm. This is the
definition we use for identifying independent directors in years before the NZX listing rules required firms
to list independent directors in their annual reports.
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directors.5 We measure female board representation in two ways: the percentage of firms
with at least one female director, and the number of female directors per board.
Finally on board composition, long-serving directors bring experience and commit-
ment to the boardroom table, but also greater ‘familiarity’ with management that can
weaken oversight and monitoring. Vafeas (2003) reports results consistent with the latter
view, suggesting that lengthy board tenure is often associated with directors who befriend
management at the expense of shareholders. NZX Listing Rules 3.3.9 and 3.3.11 specify
a 5-year maximum term of appointment for executive directors and a 1/3 minimum of
directors to retire each year (although reappointment is allowed in both cases). We define
a long-serving director as one with more than five years continuous service on the board.
2.1.2 Director Remuneration and Ownership
Although typically only a tiny proportion of firm income, there is some evidence that
directors’ fees are positively linked to CEO remuneration (‘cronyism’) and that this has
an adverse impact on firm performance, e.g., Brick et al. (2006). An alternative mechanism
for incentivising and compensating directors is via director share ownership that directly
aligns directors’ interests with those of shareholders, although too great an ownership
share can put directors in conflict with small shareholders. Bhagat and Bolton (2010) and
Bhagat et al. (1999) both find a positive impact of director share ownership on US firm
performance as do, albeit somewhat less strongly, Farrer and Ramsay (1998) for Australian
firms.
NZ has no specific restrictions on director remuneration or share ownership, al-
though the NZX Best Practice Code recommends that directors take a portion of their
remuneration in the form of non-vested shares. We include only beneficially-owned shares
in our measure of director ownership.
2.1.3 Director Activity
The most visible way in which directors fulfill their responsibilities is via attendance at
board and committee meetings. On the one hand, a greater number of meetings may
indicate more diligent boards; on the other it may simply reflect the substitution of form-
filling activities for true diligence. Interestingly, Vafeas (1999) reports that the annual
number of board meetings is negatively related to firm value, but also notes that this
result is driven by an increase in board activity following share price falls. Once this latter
effect is controlled for, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) find that firms holding more board
and committee meetings tend to have greater value.
Many directors hold directorships at more than one firm. While the holding of
multiple directorships can provide valuable experience and indicate high director quality, it
also raises the potential for workload problems that diminish overall effectiveness. Neither
Ferris et al. (2003) nor Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) find any evidence of shirking by ‘busy’
5See, for example, Radio NZ (2011)
5
directors, but Fich and Shivdasani (2006) conclude that firms with a majority of busy
outside directors are weaker performers on average. We employ two measures of director
busyness: the proportion of board members holding at least one other directorship, and
the average number of other directorships held by board members.
2.1.4 Board Committees
The formation of board committees allows specialist oversight of sensitive areas. Authors
such as Anderson and Bizjak (2003), Bradbury et al. (2006), Brick and Chidambaran
(2010), Klein (2002) and Zhang et al. (2007) examine the importance of the audit and/or
remuneration committees for various firm activities. NZX Listing Rules 3.6.1 and 3.6.2
require NZ firms listed on the main board to have an audit committee containing a major-
ity of independent directors. The Best Practice Code contains similar recommendations
regarding remuneration committees. We investigate the extent of both audit and remu-
neration committee existence and independence in NZ firms.
2.1.5 CEO Involvement
The final characteristic we analyse is the involvement of CEOs in board and committee
activities. CEO participation in board discussions and decision-making can facilitate effec-
tive communication and motivate CEOs (e.g., Brickley at al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson,
1998), but may also be associated with significant agency problems (e.g., Bebchuck and
Fried, 2004; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Apparently persuaded by the latter view, the NZX
Best Practice Code recommends that the CEO should not fill the role of board chair, nor
sit on the audit committee.
2.2 Data
The principal source of our data is the NZX Deep Archive annual reports collection. We
begin by identifying all NZX-listed firms for which an annual report is available in 1995 and
then eliminate those firms which are not NZ-registered, or whose primary listing exchange
is in another country, or whose annual report contains no useful data. For example, there
are a total of 99 firm-reports available for 1995, but 11 of these are from overseas firms
and two others contain no useful data, leaving a total of 86 firms available for analysis.
For each of these firms, we collect all available data for the variables listed in Table 1. We
then repeat this exercise for each of 2000, 2007 and 2010. We use 1995 as our starting
year as this is the first year in which the increased disclosure requirements of the 1993
Companies Act began to take effect. Prior to that time, NZ company annual reports often
contained little information about board activities, so beginning our sample period before
1995 would, therefore, have resulted in very small sample sizes for some variables..
Where information on director identity, outside directorships, and tenure is not
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Summary descriptive statistics on sample and firm size. Small firms have total assets equal
to less than $50 million (in 2010 dollars); medium firms have total assets between $50 million
and $250 million; large firms have total assets greater than $250 million.
Variable All Small Medium Large
Number of Firms
1995 86 26 34 26
2000 102 21 39 42
2007 134 58 34 42
2010 117 43 37 37
Mean Firm Size (2010 $million)
1995 644.36 18.801 120.09 1955.5
2000 833.74 22.073 128.09 1894.8
2007 864.93 19.076 135.87 1676.6
2010 565.55 16.099 141.27 1628.4
Median Firm Size (2010 $million)
1995 94.840 15.909 94.840 728.24
2000 168.57 16.198 122.90 573.18
2007 98.43 17.122 133.91 694.04
2010 113.49 8.2724 126.95 719.30
recorded in an annual report, we turn to the NZ Companies Office website.6 This contains
a searchable archive of information on all NZ-registered firms and their directors, thereby
allowing us to fill gaps in the annual reports. However, because director information is
available only on an individual basis, this is a very time-intensive solution.7
Finally, to ensure comparability across time, we express all monetary values in 2010
NZ dollars. For this purpose, we adjust non-2010 values by the appropriate percentage
increase in the NZ consumer price index, which can be obtained from the Reserve Bank
of NZ website.8
Table 2 provides some summary information about our sample, which contains 86
firms for 1995, 102 for 2000, 134 for 2007, and 117 for 2010. Mean firm size is greater
in the earlier years (reflecting in part the delisting of large firms like Carter Holt Harvey
and Lion Nathan during the period), but median size is greater at the end of the sample
period than the beginning.
We also split our sample into three somewhat arbitrary size groups: small (total
assets less than $50 million in 2010 dollars), medium (total assets between $50 million and
$250 million), and large (total assets greater than $250 million). As can be seen in Table
2, these categories divide the total number of companies up roughly equally in each sample
year, although 1995 and 2000 have relatively large proportions of firms in the medium-size
6See http://www.business.govt.nz/companies/
7For other variables, we were sometimes able to obtain additional information from the company’s
website.
8See http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/az/2989609.html
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group while small firms predominate in the latter years.
3 Primary Analysis and Results
To obtain an overall picture of what has occurred over the 15-year period, we begin by
focussing on the differences between the bookend years of 1995 and 2010; a subsequent
section examines trends revealed by the intermediate years. We assume our data for 1995
and 2010 provide representative samples of an underlying (hypothetical) population of NZ
firms during their respective years, thus allowing us to calculate some simple distributional
statistics for each of the variables appearing in Table 1. For the continuous variables, we
estimate means and medians and test for 1995–2010 differences using t- and Wilcoxon-
tests respectively. For binary variables, we report the percentage of firms having this
characteristic and test for 1995–2010 differences using a binomial z-test. In case these
simple statistics are a function of firm size, we also regress each board characteristic
on firm size (in 2010 dollars) and a sample-year dummy, and report the significance of
the heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistic associated with the latter. We also use these
estimates to shed some light on the similarities and differences between NZ boards and
those from other countries; for this purpose we focus on countries which also follow the
Anglo-European model of governance, primarily based on agency theory, e.g., Australia,
the UK, and the US.
3.1 Differences between 1995 and 2010
3.1.1 Board composition
Table 3 reveals that average board size fell from about 6.6 directors in 1995 to 5.9 in
2010, and that this decline is significant at the 1% level even after controlling for firm
size. At the same time, the representation of independent and, less clearly, non-executive
directors rose significantly to the point where on average they comprise approximately
2/3 and 4/5 respectively of boards in 2010. Moreover, the percentage of boards with
a majority of independent directors increased by 17 percentage points (46% to 63%).9
Female representation on boards also rose substantially: the percentage of boards with
at least one female director more than tripled during the 15-year period covered by our
sample, as did the average number of female directors per board (albeit to a still rather low
0.5, with a median of zero). Director tenure also saw a significant increase, with directors
having more than five years service now in the majority at the average firm.
All of these trends are broadly in line with the experience of other countries –
internationally, boards have attempted to “do more with less” and place more emphasis
on board independence. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) report similar
9Note, however, that prior to 2003 NZ firms were not required to distinguish between independent and
non-independent directors. Consequently, 1995 director independence is based in our own assessment of
who was independent and who wasn’t, and may therefore contain considerable error.
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Table 3: Board Composition
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for board composition. Variable definitions and
sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the variable names indicate
the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test is used to evaluate differences
in sample means; the W (Wilcoxon)-test is used to evaluate differences in sample medians;
the Binomial test is based on a z-statistic and is used to evaluate differences in sample
proportions; the Size-adjusted t-test extends the standard t and Binomial tests by controlling
for firm size in an OLS regression. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%)
(10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean or % Mean or % t-test Binomial Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) test t-test
Board Size 6.605 5.872 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(86, 117) (6.000) (6.000) (∗∗∗)
Non-Executive Directors 0.784 0.834 ∗ ∗∗
(86, 117) (0.833) (0.833)
Independent Directors 0.555 0.627 ∗∗ ∗∗
(59, 115) (0.500) (0.667) (∗∗)
Independent Majority 45.8% 62.6% ∗∗ ∗∗
(59, 115)
Female Director Incidence 11.6% 34.2% ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(86, 117)
Female Director Number 0.140 0.479 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(86, 117) (0.000) (0.000) (∗∗∗)
Long-Serving Directors 0.335 0.555 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(86, 117) (0.333) (0.600) (∗∗∗)
proportional changes in the size and independence of US boards between 1997 and 2003,
as do Simpson et al. (2010) for female representation. In the same vein, the data of
Kesner (1988) and Van Ness et al. (2010) imply a mean increase in US director tenure of
approximately 10% (7.2 years to 7.9 years).
Turning to international differences in levels, evidence from the US (Chhaochharia
and Grinstein, 2007; Ning et al., 2010), UK (Guest, 2009), and Australia (Kang et al.,
2007) indicates that board size is noticeably smaller in NZ, but this almost certainly reflects
the smaller size of NZ firms. More interestingly, independent director representation in NZ
is somewhat lower than elsewhere. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate the
mean representation of independent directors on US boards in 2003 to be 71.4% while Kang
et al. report that 83% of their sample of Australian firms in 2003 have an independent
director majority. Turning to female representation, Table 3 implies that females hold
approximately 8.2% of NZ directorships in 2010, somewhat lower than Adams and Ferreira
(2009) and Simpson et al. (2010) find for the US (8.9% for 1995-2003 and 11.9% in 2007
respectively) and Kang et al. (2007) report for Australia (10.37% in 2003), but somewhat
higher than Francoeur et al. (2007) estimate for Canada (7.02% in 2001-03).
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Table 4: Director Remuneration and Ownership
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for director remuneration and ownership. Variable
definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the variable
names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test is used to evaluate
differences in sample means; the W (Wilcoxon)-test is used to evaluate differences in sample
medians; the Size-adjusted t-test extends the standard t-test by controlling for firm size in
an OLS regression. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean Mean t-test Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) t-test
Chair Fees 51889 86604 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(30, 111) (46003) (70000) (∗∗∗)
Director Fees 29913 48787 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(32, 117) (27613) (39750) (∗∗∗)
Director Ownership 0.031 0.023
(69, 117) (0.005) (0.003)
3.1.2 Director Remuneration and Ownership
As can be seen in Table 4, fees paid to board chairs and directors increased by more
than 60% in real terms between 1995 and 2010. By way of comparison, the corresponding
change in the all-sector Labour Cost Index over the same period was 1.5%. Clearly,
director remuneration increased at a much faster rate than overall wages and salaries.
During the same period, director share ownership moved in the reverse direction,
with median board ownership per director equalling 0.5% of firm shares in 1995 and 0.3%
in 2010. Although the difference is statistically insignificant at conventional levels, this
change is nevertheless surprising given the NZX Best Practice Code recommendation for
share remuneration of directors.
Despite its rapid rise over the 15-year sample period, NZ director remuneration
remains fairly low compared to countries such as Australia (e.g., Henry, 2010) and the
US (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Cordeiro et al., 2000; Linn and Park, 2005), among
others, although much of this differential is likely to be due to the smaller size of NZ firms.
Turning to director share ownership, the NZ figures are similar to those obtained for
Australia by Honeine and Swan (2010), but almost an order of magnitude higher than the
approximate 0.05% ownership stake reported by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and
Bhagat and Bolton (2010) for the the typical US director. Such a difference is unsurprising
given the much greater size and value of US firms.
3.1.3 Director Activity
Apart from some weak evidence for a small decline in board meeting frequency, Table 5
reveals that overall board activity remained largely unchanged over the sample period:
board meetings take place approximately 11 times a year and each director holds approxi-
mately 8 directorships. This number of board meetings is high compared to the 7-8 annual
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Table 5: Director Activity
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for director remuneration and ownership. Variable
definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the variable
names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test is used to evaluate
differences in sample means; the W (Wilcoxon)-test is used to evaluate differences in sample
medians; the Size-adjusted t-test extends the standard t-test by controlling for firm size in
an OLS regression. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean Mean t-test Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) t-test
Board Meetings 11.12 10.88
(34, 80) (11.00) (10.00) (∗)
Total Meetings 13.70 15.05
(34, 80) (14.00) (13.50)
Busy Directors 0.868 0.883
(86, 117) (0.889) (1.000)
Multiple Directorships 8.584 7.644
(86, 117) (6.111) (6.250)
meetings reported by Al-Najjar (2010) and Brick and Chidambaran (2010) for UK and US
firms respectively. Similarly, NZ directors appear to take on a large number of other direc-
torships compared to their overseas counterparts: Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and
Ferris et al. (2003) find that the typical US director holds fewer than two directorships
and Kiel and Nicholson (2006) report a similar workload for Australian directors. How-
ever, this latter difference is almost certainly over-stated – the above authors count only
directorships in listed companies, whereas the Table 5 figures also include directorships in
unlisted firms.10
3.1.4 Board Committees
Table 6 shows the increased prominence of board committees in NZ firms. Given the
NZX requirement (introduced in 2003) that firms listing on the main board must have
a separate audit committee, it is unsurprising that the percentage of firms with such a
committee rose from 59.8 in 1995 to 95.7 in 2010. Audit committees have also become
increasingly dominated by independent directors, their representation rising from 68.1%
on average in 1995 to 80.4% in 2010. In this context, interestingly, the NZX listing rules
specify only that the audit committee contain a simple majority of independent directors,
so NZ firms appear to have voluntarily adopted structures over and above requirements.11
Similarly, even without the impetus of a listing rule, the proportion of firms operating
a separate remuneration committee more than doubled – from 34.9% to 79.3% – during
10Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) estimate the mean number of directorships per Indian director in 2003 to
be 5.49, but it is unclear whether they include unlisted firms in their calculations.
11Bradbury et al. (2006) report evidence suggesting that audit committees are effective only when all
members are independent directors.
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Table 6: Board Committees
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for board committee characteristics. Variable defi-
nitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the variable
names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test is used to evaluate
differences in sample means; the W (Wilcoxon)-test is used to evaluate differences in sample
medians; the Binomial test is based on a z-statistic and is used to evaluate differences in
sample proportions; the Size-adjusted t-test extends the standard t and Binomial tests by
controlling for firm size in an OLS regression. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean or % Mean or % t-test Binomial Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) test t-test
Audit Committee 59.8% 95.7% ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(86, 117)
Remuneration Committee 34.9% 79.3% ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(86, 117)
Audit Committee 0.681 0.804 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Independence (0.667) (0.750) (∗∗∗)
(52, 109)
Remuneration Committee 0.726 0.747
Independence (0.667) (0.750)
(31, 88)
the sample period, although independent director representation remained unchanged at
a little over 70% in the average firm.
These figures are slightly below those in the usual comparator countries. For ex-
ample, Henry (2010) finds that, as of 2002, 99% of Australian listed firms had a separate
audit committee and 88% a separate remuneration committee. For the US, Chhaochharia
and Grinstein (2007) report that 100% of listed firms had a separate audit committee in
2003, with 99% also having a separate remuneration committee. Neither study provides
details on independent director representation on these committees, but Chhaochharia
and Grinstein record that 76.8% of US firms had audit committees comprising entirely of
independent directors in 2003, so even if none of the remaining boards had an independent
majority the overall independent director representation would still be in the vicinity of
85-90% – somewhat higher than the corresponding NZ figure noted above.
3.1.5 CEO Board and Committee Involvement
CEO involvement in NZ boards changed little during the sample period. However, some of
these static levels of involvement differ markedly from what happens in other countries. In
their discussion of international governance trends, LeBlanc and Gillies (2005, p92) claim
that:
It is almost unheard of for the chief executive officer of the corporation not to
be a member of the board of directors. Indeed, in many companies, particularly
in the United States, it is not unusual for the role of the board and CEO to
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Table 7: CEO Board and Committee Involvement
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for CEO involvement on the board of directors.
Variable definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath
the variable names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. None of the
differences between 1995 and 2010 are statistically significant at conventional levels.
1995 2010
Variable % %
CEO-Chair 1.1% 0.0%
(86, 117)
CEO on Board 64.0% 66.7%
(86, 117)
CEO on Audit Committee 10.0% 7.4%
(86, 117)
CEO on Remuneration Committee 6.7% 10.1%
(86, 117)
be combined.
Neither statement holds in NZ. As Table 7 shows, virtually no NZ CEO simultaneously
filled the role of board chair in either 1995 or 2010. By contrast, Bhagat and Bolton
(2010), Brick and Chidambaran (2010), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) all report
60-70% of US firms as having combined CEO-Chair roles in the 2000s, while Henry (2010)
finds a corresponding range of 21-25% in Australia during the same period. Similarly,
far from being “almost unheard of”, approximately 1/3 of NZ CEOs do not sit on their
company’s board.
At the other end of the spectrum, CEO membership of the remuneration commit-
tee is relatively common in NZ firms, with 10.1% having this characteristic in 2010. By
contrast, Vafeas (2003) reports that only two of the 271 largest firms in the Forbes com-
pensation survey for 1997 fall into this category. Similarly, Anderson and Bizjak (2003,
p1325) note that by 1998 insiders “are essentially absent” from a random sample of 110
New York Stock Exchange firms.
3.2 1995–2010 Trends in Board Characteristics
We now address the extent to which the observed differences (or non-differences, as the case
may be) between 1995 and 2010 reflect consistent trends throughout the sample period.
To do so, we graphically depict the board characteristic values for each of the four sample
years. In order not to overload the reader with pictures, we focus on ten characteristics
we view as being the most important and/or interesting.
Figure 1 displays the results of this exercise. The level of chair and director fees, the
representation of independent and female directors, and the existence of audit and remu-
neration committees all increased monotonically over the period. Somewhat surprisingly
however, virtually none of the increases in committee existence and independent director
representation occurred between 2000 and 2007, despite this being the period spanning the
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Figure 1: 1995–2010 Trends in Board Composition, Activity, and Incentives: All Firms
Combined.
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introduction of NZX rules and recommendations regarding these characteristics. In the
cases of the audit and remuneration committees, for example, by far the greatest rate of
formation occurred prior to 2000, suggesting that the NZX initiatives were simply formal-
ising phenomena that were already occurring naturally. By contrast, the biggest increases
in chair and director fees took place during the 2000–2007 period, a somewhat unexpected
consequence of a greater official focus on governance matters.
The number of directors per board, the number of directorships per director, and
average director share ownership trended down during the fifteen year period, but not
monotonically. The first two both fell sharply between 1995 and 2007 before rebounding
somewhat in 2010. Whether this represents the beginning of a return to the past or is
simply a statistical blip remains to be seen. Director share ownership actually rose slightly
between 1995 and 2000 before falling sharply in the following ten years. Again, this is
probably not the outcome envisaged by the NZX governance initiatives.
4 Other Issues
4.1 Board Trends and Firm Size
The results presented thus far ignore possible firm size-based variation in board charac-
teristics. To address this issue, we first place each firm-year in our sample in one of the
three size categories described in section 2.2 and then re-estimate means (or percentages)
in each of these categories for a selection of the variables in Table 1.
Figure 2 summarizes the results. Some board characteristics follow the same path
regardless of firm size: in all three size categories, board size drifted gently downwards
while the existence of audit and remuneration committees became more common. Others,
however, exhibit sharply different behaviour. For example, the rate of director share
ownership remained basically unchanged in small firms, but dropped noticeably in the
other two categories, especially after 2000. Similarly, the average number of directorships
per director rose in large firms during the sample period while falling in the other two;
after starting a long way apart, by 2010 the three groups had essentially converged.
In some cases, the medium-size group showed markedly different behaviour to the
other two. For instance, female board representation was initially lowest in medium-size
firms, but by 2007 had risen to match that of large firms (with both some margin ahead
of small firms). Similarly, CEO appointment to the remuneration committee remained
largely unchanged (at 10-15%) in the medium group, but increased sharply in large and
small firms between 1995 and 2000 before tailing off to converge on the medium group’s
rate by 2010.
The graphs for chair and director fees are revealing. Not only are large firm fees con-
siderably higher, but they also increased at a much faster rate than those of the other two
(particularly compared to the small company group). Clearly, the rewards for accepting
large firm directorships rose significantly in both absolute and relative terms.
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Figure 2: 1995–2010 Trends in Board Composition, Activity, and Incentives: Firm Size
Groups. Small firms have total assets equal to less than $50 million (in 2010 dollars); medium-size firms
have total assets between $50 million and $250 million; large firms have total assets greater than $250
million.
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Table 8: Cross-Country Differences in Board Characteristics: NZX-listed versus
NZX/ASX-listed firms
Comparison of 2010 board characteristics between NZ firms listed solely on the NZX and
those jointly listed on the ASX. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The t-test is used to
evaluate differences in sample means; the Binomial test is based on a z-statistic and is used
to evaluate differences in sample proportions. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
NZX only NZX and ASX
Variable Mean or % Mean or % t-test Binomial test
Non-Executive Directors 0.830 0.858
Independent Directors 0.615 0.704
Independent Majority 60.6% 75.0%
Female Director Incidence 31.7% 50.0%
Female Director Number 0.475 0.500
Long-Serving Directors 0.562 0.512
Board Meetings 10.99 10.31
Busy Directors 88.7% 85.7%
Remuneration Committee 77.0% 93.8% ∗∗
Audit Committee 0.788 0.894 ∗∗
Independence
Remuneration Committee 0.719 0.883 ∗∗∗
Independence
CEO on Board 64.4% 81.3%
CEO on Audit Committee 8.70% 0.00% ∗∗∗
CEO on Remuneration Committee 10.7% 7.10%
4.2 Cross-listing effects
In 3.1 above, we noted some differences between NZ board characteristics and those from
other (mainly much larger) countries. This raises an important question: do such dif-
ferences primarily reflect something unique about NZ firms, or about the NZ governance
environment? To provide some preliminary evidence on this issue, we compare the board
characteristics of NZ firms listed only on the NZX with those of firms that also list on the
(much larger) Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The governance choices of such firms will
be influenced by the Australian governance environment, so by comparing these choices
with those of their NZX-only counterparts we can gauge the extent to which NZ board
characteristics reflect the NZ governance environment. Because the ASX-listed group are
typically amongst the largest NZ firms, we eschew comparison of board variables that have
an obvious connection with firm size (e.g., board size, chair and director fees) in order to
focus as closely as possible on ‘pure’ cross-listing effects.12
Table 8 reveals that differences between the two groups of firms exist primarily at
the committee level. Although dual-listed firms have more independent directors, fewer
busy and long-serving directors, a slightly smaller number of board meetings, and are
12We also do not consider variables where there is very little full-sample variation, e.g., CEO-Chair.
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Table 9: Convergence of Board Characteristics
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 standard deviations for various board characteristics. Variable
definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Differences are evaluated using an F-test.
∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Variable Standard deviation Standard deviation F-test
Board Size 2.019 1.643 ∗∗
Non-executive Directors 0.205 0.155 ∗∗∗
Independent Directors 0.183 0.198
Audit Committee Independence 0.269 0.197 ∗∗∗
Remuneration Committee Independence 0.263 0.253
log of Chair Fees 0.599 0.723
log of Director Fees 0.558 0.726 ∗∗
Director Ownership 0.050 0.043
Long Serving Directors 0.301 0.306
more likely to have at least one female director and a CEO who sits on the board, these
differences are small and statistically insignificant. By contrast, the greater propensities
of dual-listed firms to have (i) a remuneration committee and (ii) greater independent
director representation on the audit and remuneration committees are more economically
and statistically significant. Overall, however, the board choices of NZ firms do not seem
to be greatly altered by listing in another jurisdiction.
4.3 Convergence of Board Characteristics
The adoption of very similar corporate governance codes by so many countries around the
world in the last 20 years suggests the development of an international consensus on best-
practice governance, and consequently on optimal board characteristics. To the extent
this is true, we would expect to see evidence of convergence in board characteristics.
For example, the increasing importance placed on director independence implies that
fewer boards and board committees will contain a minority of independent directors, thus
reducing the dispersion in the extent to which independent directors are represented.
To examine this issue in the NZ context, we estimate standard deviations (as a proxy
for dispersion) for most of the continuous variables in our sample and test for differences
between 1995 and 2010.13 The results of this exercise appear in Table 9. Dispersion in
the number of directors per board, the board representation of non-executive directors,
and the extent of audit committee independence fell significantly between 1995 and 2010,
consistent with firms moving towards an agreed ‘best-practice’ model of governance. In
other areas, however, there is little or no sign of convergence: for independent director
13As well as eliminating the binary variables from this exercise (since standard deviations would shed
little light on convergence for such variables), we also exclude variables that were close to zero in 1995,
e.g., female representation.
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representation on both the remuneration committee and the full board, dispersion in firm
choices is unchanged during the period. Nor, after adjusting for their significant increases
in mean, is there any reduction in chair and director fee dispersion – in fact, the volatility
of director fees increases significantly.14
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Our principal findings in this paper are as follows:
I. Between 1995 and 2010, the average board size of NZ firms fell slightly, while the
board representation of non-executive, independent and female directors all rose, as
did the propensity of firms to establish separate audit and remuneration committees.
Real chair and director fees rose sharply, especially in large firms.
II. By contrast, a number of board characteristics showed relatively little evidence of
change over the sample period, including director share ownership, director involve-
ment in other companies, and CEO board and committee involvement. However,
these aggregate statistics conceal significant variation between different firm size
groups: all of the above variables rose in some size categories while falling in others.
III. The 2003 NZX corporate governance reforms appear to have had relatively little
impact on the governance choices of NZ firms: most of the change in average board
characteristics occurred before 2003, while there is only weak evidence for convergence
in board characteristics over the sample period.
IV. The board characteristics of NZ firms often differ quite markedly from those prevailing
abroad, particularly in CEO board and committee involvement, in the frequency of
board meetings, and in the number of directorships per director.
In turn, these findings reveal a number of unanswered questions about NZ boards:
(i) Why do so many NZ CEOs – approximately 1/3 – not sit on their firm’s board? And
does this have consequences for intra-firm communication, strategy and performance?
(ii) Why do so few NZ CEOs – essentially none – serve as board chair? Is this an
appropriate local response to a potential agency problem?
(iii) Relative to the typical situation overseas, a significant proportion of NZ CEOs sit
on their firm’s remuneration committee. Is this, as would appear at first glance, a
major conflict of interest, or is it an optimal response to local conditions?
(iv) Why is the representation of independent directors on NZ boards still somewhat lower
than in other countries? Is there any evidence that this hinders firm performance?
14The adjustment consists of taking the natural log of the two fees variables before estimating their
standard deviations, which is approximately equivalent to estimating the coefficient of variation of the
unlogged variables.
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(v) Why do NZ boards tend to hold more meetings than their overseas counterparts? Is
this an indicator of greater diligence or greater inefficiency?
(vi) Does the relatively large number of directorships held by NZ directors dilute their
effectiveness? Does it lead to individual director shirking by, for example, the avoid-
ance of chair and committee appointments?
(vii) How and why have NZ chair and director fees risen so markedly over the 15-year
period of our study? Does this primarily reflect rent expropriation by boards, or
increasing international competition for director talent, or compensation for increased
risks and responsibilities?
We hope that at least some of these questions thrown up by our data will motivate further
research on NZ corporate boards.
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